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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The state is incorrect when it argues that probation cannot be a sentence "the
defendant is already serving" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(l)(b). Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201(2) (Supp. 2007), located in the same chapter as section 76-3-401 (2003),
specifically defines probation as a sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 in
Addendum A. Rules of statutory construction require that this specific provision prevail
over more general language in other statutes. Additionally, the statutes the state looks to
are located in different chapters and refer to different concerns. Moreover, throughout
the Code, including section 76-3-401, the Legislature uses qualifying language to refer to
a sentence of imprisonment, thereby indicating that the word "sentence" refers to more
than just sentences of incarceration. Had the Legislature intended to limit the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision to sentences of imprisonment, it would have

used qualifying language in section 76-3-40l(l)(b). Because probation is a sentence, a
trial court can impose a subsequent sentence consecutively to a sentence of probation.
A sentence of probation does not cease to be a sentence when the tolling provision
of section 77-18-1(11) (Supp. 2007) applies. By its plain language, the tolling provision
simply makes it clear that time that passes while a probation violation is pending does not
count toward total probation time if the defendant is found to have been in violation.
Even though the time is tolled, the defendant continues to be under a sentence of
probation pursuant to section 77-18-1. And, if the defendant is subsequently found not to
have violated probation, the time is not tolled. If the state were correct that a sentence of
probation ceases to be a sentence when a probation violation is filed, the sentence would
nevertheless continue in cases where a defendant was later absolved. This presents an
unworkable rule because when a probation violation is pending, a judge imposing
sentence in a subsequent case would have no way of knowing whether the defendant was
under sentence or not.
Practical concerns also support the conclusion that the consecutive/concurrent
sentencing decision must be made at sentencing and not following probation violation.
The trial judge imposing sentence in the second case will have an updated presentence
report and can consider all of the necessary factors and make a decision as to whether
consecutive sentences should be imposed. Instead of having to make sure that the
probation violation judge has an updated presentence report and conducts a sentencing
hearing that complies with due process as part of the probation violation proceeding, the
second sentencing judge is in a better position to fully consider the issue of consecutive
2

or concurrent sentencing. Such a procedure ensures that consecutive sentencing
decisions are based on all of the relevant factors found in section 76-3-401(2) and not
inappropriately guided by the fact that the defendant violated probation. Moreover, it
precludes situations like this one where the judge who had the first case based the
consecutive sentences on subsequent activity committed by the defendant after he was
sentenced and placed on probation.
As a final matter, Utah's rules and statutes plainly anticipate that sentencing occur
shortly after the defendant is adjudged guilty, that the judgment is entered at that time,
and that the judgment include the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision. The
provision in the consecutive/concurrent sentencing statute that allows the Board to
request clarification of the consecutive/concurrent sentencing order does not create trial
court jurisdiction to make the decision after a defendant has been sent to prison.
Moreover, that subsection was not implicated in this case. When section 76-3-401(1) is
read in conjunction with Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and other
statutes, it is evident that Judge Reese did not have jurisdiction to make the consecutive
sentencing decision following probation violation.
ARGUMENT
THE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING DECISION MUST BE MADE AT
SENTENCING, STATED ON THE RECORD, AND ENTERED IN THE
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT; SINCE PROBATION IS A
SENTENCE, A JUDGE CAN IMPOSE A SUBSEQUENT FELONY
SENTENCE CONSECUTIVELY WITH A SENTENCE OF PROBATION
THAT A DEFENDANT IS ALREADY SERVING.

3

The state's argument that the consecutive sentencing order must be imposed
following probation revocation rather than at the time the judgment and commitment is
entered is based on two incorrect, alternative claims.1 First, the state argues that
probation is not a sentence even though statutory language establishes otherwise.
Alternatively, the state argues that even if probation is a sentence, it ceases to be a
sentence when a probation violation is filed because the probationary time is tolled.
Utah's rules, statutes and case law easily dispense with the first claim since probation is
specifically defined as a sentence and Utah's statutory scheme recognizes probation as a
possible sentence in a criminal case. Additionally, the fact that a defendant does not
receive credit for time that passes while a probation violation is pending does not mean
that a defendant is not serving a sentence. Moreover, practical and policy considerations
demonstrate that the goals of the consecutive/concurrent sentencing statute are best
served when that decision is made at the time of sentencing rather than following
probation violation. Because the Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) plainly requires that the
consecutive sentencing decision be made at sentencing and included in the judgment and
commitment and Utah's statutory scheme otherwise supports this requirement, the

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 plainly requires that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing
decision be made at sentencing and not following probation violation. Even if the state
were correct that a sentence of probation cannot be a sentence "the defendant is already
serving" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, the state has not provided support for its
argument that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision can therefore be made
following probation violation. In other words, even if the state were correct that
probation is not a sentence under section 76-3-401, it does not automatically follow that a
judge can make the decision following probation violation.
4

consecutive sentencing order entered in this case following probation violation should be
stricken.
A. A Criminal Defendant Can Be Sentenced to Probation; a Defendant Who
Has Been Placed on Probation is Therefore uAlready Serving'9 a Sentence.
As outlined in Petitioner's opening brief, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) requires a
trial court to make the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision after the defendant
"has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense," to state the decision on the
record, and "indicate [it] in the order of judgment and commitment." Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-401(1). The statute allows a trial court to order a sentence "to run concurrently or
consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving." Id Because
probation is a sentence, it qualifies as a sentence "the defendant is already serving" for
purposes of the consecutive sentencing statute. See id.
First, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) specifically states that probation is a
sentence. The state acknowledges in passing that this provision allows a trial court to
sentence a defendant to probation, but fails to aclcnowledge that the statute also explicitly
defines probation as a sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) states:
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of
them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (emphasis added). Pursuant to "well-settled principle^]
of statutory construction," this specific, explicit definition of probation as a sentence
5

takes precedence over any more general statutory implication that the state argues to
support its claim that probation is not a sentence under Utah's statutory scheme.
Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, ^19, 167 P.3d
1080 ("We acknowledge the well-settled principle of statutory construction that 'when
two provisions address the same subject matter and one provision is general while the
other is specific, the specific provision prevails.'") (further citations omitted).
Although this specific definition of probation as a sentence is found not only in the
same title as Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, but also in the same chapter, the state relies on
what it argues are general implications in statutes found in Title 77 to support its
argument that probation is not a sentence a defendant "is already serving" within the
meaning of section 76-3-401. See Respondent's brief at 10-12. This argument
disregards not only the rules of statutory construction that require that the specific
provision prevail, but also the organization of Utah's Code and the interrelation of
statutes found within a specific chapter. Because probation is specifically included as a
possible sentence in the same chapter and immediately preceding the consecutive
sentencing statute, it necessarily follows that probation is a sentence the defendant "is
already serving" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1).
Rather than focusing on the specific definition of probation as a sentence found in
76-3-201, the state relies primarily on a statute discussing probation in the chapter of
Title 77 pertaining to "Pardons and Paroles." See Respondent's brief at 12. Although the
state is correct that Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10)(2003) states "[probation is an act of
grace by the court suspending imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence
6

upon prescribed conditions," that language is general in nature and pertinent to the role of
the Board of Pardons. Because the statute does not specifically define sentences that a
defendant can serve, its general language does not trump the specific language in section
76-3-201 which clearly states that probation is a sentence under that chapter. Moreover,
in discussing the Board of Pardons' authority, a subsequent statute specifically refers to
"persons committed to serve sentences." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(l)(a) (Supp. 2007).
In other words, when the Legislature needed to specify the sentences over which the
Board has authority, it expressly included qualifying language demonstrating that the
sentence was one of imprisonment. Id
Including qualifying language when the statutory language involves a sentence of
imprisonment rather than all possible sentences is consistent with other statutes and rules.
See e.g. Utah R. Crim. P. 27(a)(2), (d)(2) & (f)(2) (referring to "a sentence that does not
include a term of incarceration in jail or prison"); Utah Code Ann. §77-20-10(1) (Supp.
2007) (including qualifying language to distinguish sentences that contain "a term of
imprisonment in jail or prison"); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(d) (including qualifying language to
distinguish sentences where "a jail or prison sentence is imposed"); Utah Code Ann. §7835a-302(4)(a) (2002) (including qualifying language to refer to a "sentence of
imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3(1) (2003) (including qualifying language to
specify a "sentence of imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-208(1) (2003) (referring
to "[p]ersons sentenced to imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (5)(d) (2003)
(allowing court to "execute the original sentence of imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. §
63-25a-410(l)(f) (2004) (exempting "any convicted offender serving a sentence of
7

imprisonment" from reparations); Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4(6) (2007) (requiring
"sentence of incarceration" under certain circumstances). Moreover, the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing statute contains another subsection that explicitly
defines "imprisoned" as meaning that a person has been "sentenced and committed to a
secure correctional facility ...." Utah Code Ann. 76-3-401(12). Hence, in the context of
section 76-3-401 and other statutes, when the Legislature intends to refer only to those
sentences which involve imprisonment, it includes qualifying language specifying that
the statute refers to a sentence of imprisonment.
Had the Legislature intended a sentence a defendant was "already serving" to be
limited to sentences where the defendant was actually imprisoned for purposes of the
consecutive sentencing statute, it would have used the language found in section 76-3401(12) and elsewhere in the Code in drafting the consecutive sentencing statute. Since
the Legislature chose not to include qualifying language indicating that the consecutive
sentencing decision applied only to sentences of imprisonment the defendant was already
serving, yet clearly understood the distinctions in drafting section 76-3-401, sentences a
"defendant is already serving" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (b) are not limited to
sentences where the defendant is imprisoned.
In addition to the specific definition of probation as a sentence and the lack of
qualifying language indicating that the consecutive sentencing decision applies only to
sentences of incarceration, other provisions of the Utah Code and Rules further
demonstrate that probation is a sentence. For example, Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure recognizes that probation is a sentence since it allows "[a] sentence of fine,
8

imprisonment, or probation" to be stayed. Utah R. Crim. P. 27(a)(2). Utah Code Ann. §
20A-2-101.5(2)(a) (2007) recognizes probation as a sentence since it allows a convicted
felon's right to vote to be restored when "the felon is sentenced to probation." See also
e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-505(l) (2005) (referring to probation as a possible
sentence); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-507(3) (2005) (recognizing probation as a sentence);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-5 (2003) (recognizing probation as a sentence).
As this Court acknowledged in Velasquez v. Pratt 443 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Utah
1968), a person who is on probation, uis deemed to be actually serving the sentence
imposed." Id. (citing Baine v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d 554 (Utah 1959)). This is consistent
with Utah's statutory scheme, as outlined above and in Petitioner's opening brief, which
recognizes probation as a sentence. It is also consistent with Utah procedure, which
requires that sentence, which can be a sentence of fine, probation or imprisonment, be
imposed from two to 45 days after verdict or plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Contrary to
the state's argument, probation is a sentence and under section 76-3-401, it can be a
sentence "the defendant is already serving." Id Accordingly, when Judge Atherton
sentenced Anderson, he was already serving a sentence on the prior theft case. Pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), Judge Atherton was therefore the appropriate judge to
decide whether the two cases were to run consecutively, not Judge Reese following the
subsequent probation violation determination.

9

B. A Defendant is Still Serving a Sentence Even if He is Charged with a
Probation Violation
The state argues alternatively that even if a sentence of probation is a sentence, it
ceases to be sentence when a probation violation report is filed because of the tolling
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11). This argument fails because (1) it is not
supported by the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) or any other statute;
and (2) it is illogical and unworkable.
Although the probation period is tolled and any time that passes while the
probation violation is pending does not count toward the probationary time when a
defendant is found to be in violation of probation, nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(11) suggests that a probationer who has been charged with a probation violation is not
serving a sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 shows that a defendant remains under
sentence while the probation violation is pending. In fact, were it not for the sentence of
probation, there would be no basis for a probation violation report or hearing; if the state
were correct that the sentence of probation ceases to exist when a probation violation
report is filed, trial courts would not have authority to proceed with probation
revocations.
The state is correct that Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) requires that "[t]he running
of the probation period is tolled" when a probation violation report is filed or an order to
show cause is issued (Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b)) and u[a]ny time served by a
probationer outside of confinement" after a probation violation is charged does not count
to the total probation time wiunless the probationer is exonerated." Utah Code Ann. § 7710

18-1(1 l)(a)(i). But these provisions say only that a defendant cannot count the time
toward the total probation time; they do not say that the defendant is not serving a
sentence.
Rather than establishing that probation ceases to be a sentence when a probation
violation report is filed, the tolling provisions clarify that a defendant under a sentence of
probation cannot count the time towards the total probation. Id. The tolling provision
therefore requires a sentence of probation to be in place and that the sentence continue
while the probation violation is pending; in fact, the probation violation procedure is part
of a sentence of probation and absent a sentence of probation, there would be no basis for
such a probation violation proceeding. Contrary to the state's argument, nothing in this
subsection suggests that probation ceases to be a sentence when a probation violation
report is filed or serves to undercut the explicit provision of section 76-3-201 that
probation is a sentence.
Moreover, the state's argument that probation ceases to be a sentence when a
probation violation report is filed contains obvious practical limitations. The state seems
to assume that any time a probation violation report is filed, the defendant will be found
in violation of probation and the sentence of probation will therefore cease to exist at the
time the probation violation report is filed. See Respondent's brief at 13. But in cases
where a defendant is found not to have been in violation, the defendant does receive
credit toward the probationary period for the time during which the probation violation
was pending. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11). Under the state's unique argument, a
defendant who was held on a probation violation and subsequently found not to have
11

violated probation would be serving a sentence the entire time whereas a defendant who
is found to have violated probation would cease to serve a sentence at the time the
probation violation report is filed. A judge in another case who was imposing sentence
while a probation violation was pending in an earlier case would have no way of
knowing, if the state's argument were correct, whether the person was "already serving"
a sentence. This makes the state's argument under section 77-18-1(11) that a sentence of
probation ceases to be a sentence when a probation violation is charged unworkable from
a practical standpoint.
Because the language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) and practical
considerations fail to support the state's novel claim that a sentence ceases to exist when
a probation violation report is filed, the state's claim that Anderson was not serving a
sentence because a probation violation report was filed fails.
C. Practical Considerations Further Demonstrate that the State is Incorrect
that Probation is not a Sentence for Consecutive/Concurrent Sentencing
Purposes
As the dissent in this case noted, "[t]he majority's definition of 'already serving'
may often lead to illogical results." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, ^ 24, 157 P.3d
809 (Davis, J., dissenting). Practical considerations in addition to the problems outlined
by the dissent and in Petitioner's opening brief further demonstrate that the majority's
resolution was incorrect. That resolution allows a trial court to impose a sentence
consecutively with another sentence even though the crime in the other case occurred
after the crime in the case at issue. It also allows imposition of consecutive sentences
even though the judge overseeing the probation violation generally does not have an
12

updated presentence report and is imposing consecutive sentences based on the fact of the
probation violation rather than the factors outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). In
this case, where Judge Atherton imposed judgment for the second criminal episode and
had the benefit of an updated presentence report, practical considerations favor her
making the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision at sentencing instead of Judge
Reese following probation revocation.
As the dissent pointed out, the majority's decision is illogical and impractical in
part because a probationary sentence that included jail time would trigger the consecutive
sentencing statute whereas a probationary sentence without jail time would not.
Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, ^(24 (Davis, J., dissenting). Instead of providing trial courts
with clear guidance as to which court makes the consecutive/concurrent sentencing
decision, the majority's decision seems to suggest that Judge Reese would not have been
free to impose consecutive sentences if Anderson had actually served jail time as part of
probation. The illogical and inconsistent application of the majority's decision further
demonstrates that it is incorrect.
The majority's decision is also unworkable because it allows a judge to impose
consecutive sentences based almost entirely on the fact of the probation violation rather
than based on the factors set forth in section 76-3-401(2) after a full sentencing hearing.
The judge at the probation violation hearing may not have an updated presentence report.
While the second sentencing judge generally has an updated presentence report and holds
a full sentencing hearing that complies with due process and considers all relevant
sentencing factors, ensuring that the probation violation judge also gets an updated
13

presentence report and conducts a complete sentencing hearing would be necessary for
the judge to apply the section 76-3-401 factors and comply with due process and Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure 22. The majority's decision also allows imposition of
consecutive sentences in a crime that occurred first; that happened in this case where
Judge Reese imposed consecutive sentences even though the theft crime occurred and
was adjudicated prior to the robberies. Judge Atherton, v\ho possessed an updated
presentence report and detailed facts about the new crime, was in a better position to
apply the statutory factors and assess whether consecutive sentences were appropriate.
Hence, the majority's decision allows consecutive sentences to be imposed based solely
or primarily on the fact of the probation violation rather than a balanced consideration of
the factors set forth in section 76-3-401(2).
The unpublished decision in State v. Workman, 2007 UT App 199U, further
demonstrates the impracticality of allowing the probation violation judge to make the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision following revocation. The state is correct
that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision was made following probation
revocation in Workman. But Workman did not address the issue in this case as to
whether the probation revocation judge had the authority to order consecutive sentences
following probation revocation, so Workman does not provide direct support for the
state's position. Workman does, however, show the difficulties that occur in fairly
determining the propriety of consecutive sentences when the probation revocation judge
makes the decision. In fact, after imposing consecutive sentences, the probation violation
judge in Workman retained jurisdiction a to make a change as to the consecutive sentence
14

if there is a recommendation" from the other sentencing court. Id at ^[ 2. The probation
violation judge apparently recognized that the judge who would be sentencing Workman
on the new case would be in a better position to assess the consecutive/concurrent
sentencing decision as part of a complete sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, the
probation violation judge suggested that he might be willing to defer to the decision of
the other court. Rather than suggesting that the state's position provides the better
procedure, Workman highlights a problem in allowing the probation violation judge to
make the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision.
The majority's decision in this case further impacts on the finality of judgments,
the timing for filing an appeal and Utah criminal procedure in general. Although a
judgment is considered final when judgment is entered, allowing a consecutive
sentencing determination to be made following probation violation injects a lack of
finality. Although historically and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12), trial courts
have been limited to revoking probation and executing the original sentence, the
majority's new rule allows courts to actually impose an additional and harsher sentence
following probation revocation. Under the majority's decision, a criminal defendant
might appeal from the initial sentence as an abuse of discretion, then file a second appeal
after probation revocation, arguing factors similar to those argued in support of the abuse
of discretion at sentencing to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing consecutive sentences. Allowing Judge Reese to impose consecutive sentences
following probation violation was contrary not only to the language of section 76-3-
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401(1) but also violated established procedure which consistently recognizes that final
judgment is entered shortly after a criminal defendant is adjudged guilty.
D. Under Utah Law, the Consecutive/Concurrent Sentencing Decision Must
be Made at Sentencing and Entered in the Judgment and Commitment
As previously outlined, Utah's statutes and rules contemplate that a criminal
sentence, including the consecutive sentencing decision, be stated on the record and
entered in the judgment and commitment, ordinarily between two and 45 days after plea
or verdict. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). Utah's statutes and rules work
together to ensure that trial courts have the tools necessary to make an informed
sentencing decision at that time, and also to ensure that a final judgment allowing a
timely appeal is in place shortly after verdict or plea, regardless of whether the defendant
is placed on probation. As has been shown, requiring that the consecutive/concurrent
sentencing decision be made at sentencing and entered in the judgment is consistent with
the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, other statutes, and practical
considerations; it is also consistent with the requirements of Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and is not undermined by the clarification provision of Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-401(4).
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure further demonstrates that section
76-3-401(1) requires that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision be made at
sentencing and not following probation violation. Rule 22(a) uses language similar to
that in section 76-3-401(1) when it requires that sentencing occur shortly after a person is
adjudged guilty. Rule 22(a) is also consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) in
16

requiring that the prosecutor and defendant be allowed to present evidence relevant to
sentencing - and the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision - at the sentencing
hearing held shortly after a person is adjudged guilty. Rule 22(c) is likewise consistent
with section 76-3-401(1) in indicating that sentence is imposed and judgment and
commitment is entered shortly after a person is adjudged guilty, and not following
probation violation. Because section 76-3-401(1) requires that the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision be made at sentencing and indicated in the
order of judgment and commitment, and Rule 22 works hand in hand with this statute to
outline the procedure for a fair sentencing, Rule 22 further demonstrates that the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision must be made at sentencing.
The provision in Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4) which allows the Board of
Pardons to "request clarification from the [trial] court" if the judgment does not contain a
consecutive/concurrent sentencing order does not change the requirement that the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision be made at sentencing and not following
probation violation. Although Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) does allow the Board to
ask for clarification if the judgment and commitment does not contain a
consecutive/concurrent sentencing order, it does not authorize the trial court to make the
decision after judgment has been entered and jurisdiction has been transferred to the
Board of Pardons. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) states:
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall
enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run
consecutively or concurrently.
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Id. Although this section was meant to clarify that the Board need not presume that
sentences are to run concurrently if the judgment does not explicitly state otherwise (see
former Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2002)), it simply affects the procedure that can be
utilized by the Board for clarification if the judgment is not clear and does not create
jurisdiction for further proceedings in the trial court.
Additionally, if the trial court were to consider the question of consecutive
sentences for the first time upon receipt of a letter from the Board, the court would be
required to hold a hearing and consider all of the factors outlined in Utah Code Ann. §763-401(2) in order to comply with statutory, rule and due process requirements. Nothing
in this section or elsewhere in the Code grants the trial court jurisdiction to consider
sentencing matters in a criminal case after judgment has been entered, the defendant has
been committed to prison, and jurisdiction has been transferred to the Board of Pardons.
When section 76-3-401 is read as a whole, it is evident that subsection (4) is meant to do
nothing more than do away with the presumption of concurrent sentences and instead
allow the Board to receive clarification regarding a previously imposed sentence.
Moreover, subsection (4) was not implicated in this case because the Board did not
request clarification of the sentence and the judgment Judge Atherton entered did not
require clarification. By its plain language, section 76-3-401(4) applies only when the
Board requests clarification in a case; that has not occurred here. And, because Judge
Atherton considered the issue and imposed concurrent sentences for the two felony
counts in her case but did not order that the counts run consecutively with Anderson's
18

other case even though Anderson had previously been convicted of theft and a probation
violation was pending, the Board may well consider Judge Atherton's judgment to be
clear and not require clarification. In other words, because Judge Atherton considered
the issue and determines that concurrent sentences were appropriate, her judgment did
not require clarification. Hence, subsection (4) is not implicated in this case and did not
create jurisdiction for Judge Reese to make the consecutive sentencing decision following
probation revocation.
As outlined above, Utah's statutes and rules recognize probation as a sentence and
require that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision be made at sentencing and
not following probation violation. The unworkability of allowing the decision to be made
after a probation violation further demonstrates that the court of appeals incorrectly
upheld the procedure. In this case, where Judge Reese imposed a consecutive sentencing
order following probation revocation, that order should be stricken.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner, David Scott Anderson, respectfully requests that this Court overturn the
decision of the court of appeals and order that the consecutive sentencing order imposed
by Judge Reese be stricken.
SUBMITTED this ^ 3 day of January, 2008.

JOAN C. WATT
DEBRA M. NELSON
Attorneys for Petitioner
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(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003)
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and
commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other;
and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any
other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims,
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or
concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under
Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:

